Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 17
Number 4 Symposium on Punitive Damages

Article 9

10-1-1995

Giving Meaning to the Term Genocide as It Applies to U.S.
Immigration Policy
Paul John Chrisopoulos

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Paul John Chrisopoulos, Giving Meaning to the Term Genocide as It Applies to U.S. Immigration Policy, 17
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 925 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol17/iss4/9

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

GIVING MEANING To THE TERM "GENOCIDE" AS IT APPLIES TO
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Atrocious acts of genocide have become more and more
prevalent in the past three years. During this period, ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia caused the death of thousands of innocent
Muslims, Croats, and Serbs.1 In April 1994, gangs of machetewielding Hutus hunted down members of the Tutsi ethnic group
in Rwanda, taking over 500,000 lives.2 Not since World War II
has the world witnessed such dramatic acts of "genocide."
After the persecution and extermination of millions of noncombatants during World War II, the United Nations passed a
resolution in hopes of preventing such acts 3 On December 11,
1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide ("Convention").4 The Convention recognized genocide
as a crime under international law and provided for its punishment.5 Unfortunately, the Convention did little either to prevent
or to punish these acts.
The problem with the Convention is that it lacks legitimacy in
the world community. The law is meaningless unless states
actively enforce it. Article XI of the Convention requires ratification by member-states of the United Nations,6 yet many states
took up to fifty years to ratify the Convention.7 The United
States, which prides itself on protecting human rights, did not
1. Carol J. Williams, Bosnian Serbs Snub U.N. Chief, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1,1994, at Al.

"Two million Bosnians have already been made homeless by the rebels' siege and their
practice of 'ethnic cleansing,' and 200,000-most of them Muslims-are dead or missing."
Id
2. John-Thor Dahlburg, U.N. Panel Vows Justice in Rwanda, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1994, at All.
3. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.

9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Convention].
4. Id
5. Id at 280.
6. Id at 284.

7. United States: Genocide Convention Implementation Act of 1987,18 U.S.C. § 1091
(1994) (enabling the United States to become the 98th party to the Convention)
[hereinafter Implementation Act].
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become a member of the Convention until November 4, 1988,
nearly forty years after its adoption.8
Shortly after U.S. implementation of the Convention, the
United States attempted to further legitimize the Convention by
enacting the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 ("INA of
1990"). This Act considers genocide as an offense punishable by
deportation pursuant to U.S. immigration law. No immigration
court in the United States has yet been presented with a deportation case under the newly enacted genocide provision. Additionally, the global community lacks a clear and contemporary
definition of "genocide." This Comment addresses how a U.S.
immigration court should determine which persons are deportable
under the genocide provision of the INA of 1990.
Part II of this Comment describes the historical background
of genocide and how the global community has dealt with it. The
section examines the events that led up to the Convention and the
Convention itself. The historical background of the international
community's response to genocide provides the foundation for the
analysis of the United States' own immigration legislation on genocide. Part III examines existing immigration policy with particular
emphasis on the exclusionary provisions for the categories of both
Nazi and other genocide participants. It also explains some of the
legislative history behind the acts that excluded those participants.
Part IV critiques existing U.S. immigration policy as it pertains
to participants of genocide. U.S. immigration policy currently
lacks a clear definition of genocide. The U.S. courts must deal
with this problem, and also with some related constitutional
concerns. Finally, Part V furnishes three proposals intended to
remedy the current problems of the INA of 1990, and Part VI
concludes that the most effective remedy must derive at the
international level.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Events leading up to the Genocide Convention of 1948
Following World War I, the members of the Preliminary
Peace Conference at Versailles appointed the Commission on the
8. Id
9. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 §212(A)(3)(E),
§ 1182(a)(3)(E)(ii) (1994) [hereinafter INA of 1990].

8

U.S.C.
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Responsibility of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties
("Commission").'0 The Commission had the authority to inquire
into violations of the customs of war." The Commission delineated numerous acts characteristic of genocide, such as murder,
massacre, torture, rape, and abduction of women. 2 The Commission recommended the establishment of an international court
composed of the victor nations of World War I to prosecute the
various offenses. 3 Despite the recommendation, no tribunal
convened.
The London Charter established the grounds and procedure
to prosecute Nazi war criminals before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg. 4 This Charter called for the prosecution
of three types of crimes: war crimes, crimes against peace, and
crimes against humanity. 5 Article 6(c) of the Charter defines
crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connec16
tion with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."'
The Tribunal had its shortcomings. It narrowly interpreted
the Charter so that persons could only be convicted of crimes
against humanity if they had committed those crimes in connection
with or in execution of an aggressive war. 7 One implication of
this construction is that crimes committed before the start of the
war did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."8 Another
10. HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR-THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 23 (1993).

Members of the Commission included two representatives each from France, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, and one representative each from Belgium,
Greece, Poland, Romania, and Serbia. Id
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Id
14. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 5, 1945,
89 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter London Charter]. A year later, the Charter for the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East accomplished the same for the prosecution
of war criminals in the Far East. Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, Tokyo, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589.
15. London Charter, supra note 14, at 279.
16. M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against Humanity": The Need for a Specialized
Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 463 (1994).
17. LAWRENCE J.LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
24 (1991).

18. Id
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consequence is that since World War II, this Charter has not applied in instances of domestic strife. For example, genocide is
alleged to have occurred in Turkey against the Armenian people
around 1915, in Rwanda in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and in
Burundi in the early 1970s.19 During such periods of domestic
turmoil, genocide may very well have occurred even though a state
of war did not exist.' Because the Charter required the existence of a "state of war," these alleged acts of genocide did not fall
under the Charter. Therefore, the U.N. General Assembly sought
to establish a convention that would apply whenever the crime of
genocide occurred."
B. The Genocide Convention of 1948
On December 11, 1948, the United Nations passed the
Genocide Convention." The Convention's passage came after
much debate in the U.N. General Assembly. The U.N. Economic
and Social Council ("ECOSOC") originally delegated to the U.N.
Secretariat the task of drafting the Convention.' Upon reviewing
the draft, most representatives of the ECOSOC felt that the draft
lacked realism.24 The Australian representative stated that "while
speed was essential, it was even more important to ensure that the
convention.., be based on solid legal and moral principles which
would command universal respect and would be enforced."'2 5
Because of the deficiencies of the Secretariat's draft, the ECOSOC
created an ad hoc committee consisting of representatives from
China, France, Lebanon, Poland, United States, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and Venezuela.26 The Sixth Legal Committee
of the General Assembly revised this document, and its final draft
was adopted by the General Assembly.27

19. See EDWARD ALEXANDER, A CRIME OF VENGEANCE: AN ARMENIAN STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE (1991); L. KUPER, THE PITY OF IT ALL 170-208 (1977); T. MELADY,
BURUNDI: THE TRAGIC YEARS (1974).

20. LEBLANC, supra note 17, at 24.
21. Id.at 25.
22. Convention, supra note 3.
23. LEBLANC, supra note 17, at 25. The Secretariat prepared a draft by June 1947 by
using experts in international and criminal law as consultants. Id
24. U.N. ESCOR, 3d Sess., 139th mtg. at 146, U.N. Doc. E/447-623 (1948).
25. Id at 141.
26. LEBLANC, supra note 17, at 28.
27. Id The committee's deliberations were marked by sharp differences; thus, many
of the Convention's provisions were heavily influenced by political and ideological
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Several of the Convention's articles are particularly noteworthy. Article I of the Convention states that genocide is a crime
under international law and calls for its prevention and punishment. 28
Article II specifies that a person must intend to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.29 It provides the
following examples as evidence of genocide: (1) killing members
of a group; (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members
of a group; (3) deliberately inflicting conditions on the group that
will bring about physical destruction; (4) imposing measures upon
a group to prevent births; and (5) forcefully transferring children
from one group to another. 0
Article III lists the following acts as criminal: (1) genocide; (2)
conspiracy to commit genocide; (3) direct and public incitement to
commit genocide; (4) attempt to commit genocide; and (5)
complicity in genocide.3 1 Article V requires the signatory nations
to enact legislation necessary to effectively impose penalties on
persons guilty of genocide. 2 Finally, Article VIII allows any signatory state to request that the United Nations take appropriate
action to prevent and suppress acts of genocide. 3
III. EXISTING U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
A. Overview of U.S. Deportation Procedure
For most of the nineteenth century, the federal government
lacked a general deportation statute.' Most aliens were permitted
to remain in the country for as long as they wished, and it was not
until the late nineteenth century that Congress began to restrict

considerations. Representatives of states with monarchies pointed out that their kings
could not be brought to trial, and that the words "heads of State" could not be used. Id
at 29. Consequently, the drafters of Article IV of the Convention settled on the words

"constitutionally responsible rulers" intending to create an exemption for monarchs who
cannot be brought to trial. Id at 30.
28. Convention, supra note 3, at 280.

29. Id
30. Id
31. Id

32. Id
33. Convention, supra note 3, at 282.
34. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND

POLICY 348 (1985).
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the presence of aliens in the United States. 35 In 1913, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of deportation
proceedings. Justice Holmes wrote:
It is thoroughly established that Congress has the power to
order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country
it deems hurtful. The determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is
the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the
Government to harbor persons whom it does not want.3
Deportation proceedings begin by issuing an order to show
cause that sets forth the factual allegations of the charge, the
statutory provisions allegedly violated, and the nature of the proceedings 37 Prior to the hearing, several informal conferences
may be held that could lead to stipulations shortening the hearing.38 At the hearing, the immigration judge must determine
deportability by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence.3
Thus, the provision authorizing the deportation must be clearly
laid out so as to allow consistent application. As the U.S.
deportation provision on perpetrators of genocide stands now, it
lacks the clarity necessary to ensure its proper and consistent
application.
B. Background: U.S. Immigration Policy Since World War II
Before examining the current state of U.S. immigration policy,
this Comment briefly sets out a historical background of that
policy. Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act ("DPA") in
1948, shortly after World War II, as a mechanism to temporarily
eliminate restrictive immi ation quotas and to allow relief to
persons displaced by war.' In 1950, Congress amended section
13 of the DPA to expressly bar issuing an entrance visa "to any
person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person

35. EDwIN HARwOOD, IN LIBERTY'S SHADow 2 (1986). The irst restrictions came

in the way of qualitative and quantitative barriers to immigration under an ideology of
"restrictive nationalism." Id.
36. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
37. ALEINiKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 34, at 403.
38. Jack Wasserman, PracticalAspects of Representing an Alien at a Deportation
Hearing,14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 111, 117 (1976).
39. Id. at 120.
40. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, § 2(B), 62 Stat. 1009 (1948) [hereinafter
DPA].
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because of race, religion, or national origin."4 For the first time,
the United States attempted to exclude participants of the Nazi
civilian persecutions.
Congressional adoption of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 ("INA of 1952") represented the first comprehensive
statement of U.S. immigration policy.42 Unlike the DPA, the
INA of 1952 did not contain a provision explicitly excluding
persons who assisted in persecution.' Consequently, it created
a loophole that allowed Nazi persecutors to enter the United

States.
Congress abolished this loophole by enacting the 1978 Holtzman Amendment."
Section 103 of the 1978 Amendment
expressly excluded individuals who participated in the Nazi

persecution. 4 This amendment permanently established within
U.S. immigration law the policy provision that originally appeared
in the DPA," and became the main device used to exclude or

deport Nazi participants from the United States.47 Unlike other
orders of deportation, persons deportable under this provision are

ineligible for most forms of relief from deportation.

41. 1950 Amendment to Displaced Persons Act, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219, 227 (1950).
42. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1953) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994)) [hereinafter INA of 1952].
43. Section 340(a) of the INA of 1952 authorized U.S. officials to deport people who
gained entrance into the country either illegally, by concealment of a material fact, or by
a willful misrepresentation of a material fact. Thus, one who has entered the United
States under the DPA by concealing his assistance in the persecution of civilians, is still
subject to deportation. Id.
44. Immigration and Nationality Act-Nazi-Germany, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat.
2065 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E)(i) (1994)).
45. Id The Act explicitly denied entrance to or made subject to deportation
[a]ny alien who, during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on
May 8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with(I) the Nazi government in Germany,
(II) any government in any area occupied by the military forces of the Nazi
government of Germany,
(III) any government established with the assistance or cooperation of the Nazi
overnment of Germany, or
any government which was an ally of the Nazi government of Germany,
ordered, incited, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion.
Id
46. H.R. REP. No. 1452,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4700,4702.
47. See infra Part V.A. discussing certain INS trials against alleged Nazi participants.
48. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 34, at 642.
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C. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990

1. Legislative history behind the addition of "genocide" as an
excludable/deportable offense under U.S. immigration policy
Article V of the Convention states that the "Contracting
Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective
Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the
other acts enumerated in Article III.""4 As Article V reflects, the
Convention is not a self-executing instrument. Rather, the
individual participant states are responsible for implementing the
necessary legislation that will give the Convention some credence
in the international community. An international treaty cannot
deter acts of genocide unless states enforce the treaty through their
own domestic laws.
The United States did not become a member-state to the
Convention until November 4, 1988, when Congress passed the
Genocide Implementation Act of 1987 ("Implementation Act"). o
The purpose of this Act was "to create a new federal offense that
prohibits the commission of acts with the specific intent to destroy,
in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group; and to provide adequate penalties for such acts.""1 This
Act set the legislative course for including "genocide" as an
excludable offense in the INA of 1990.
While the United States played a leading role in drafting the
Convention in 1950, remarkably it did not implement any legislation until some forty years later. President Truman submitted the
Convention for Senate advice and consideration on June 16, 1949
and, since that time, each subsequent President, except Eisenhower, called for its ratification. 2 On May 21, 1985, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to send the
Convention back to the Senate floor for further consideration

49.
50.
51.
4156.
52.

Convention, supra note 3, at 280.
Implementation Act, supra note 7.
S. REP. No. 333, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
Id.
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along with some attached Committee provisions. 5 3 On February
19, 1986, the Senate voted eighty-three to eleven in favor of its
ratification subject to the attached Committee provisions.'
A brief overview of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
provisions is necessary to give a statutory interpretation to "genocide" in the INA of 1990. The Senate attached two reservations
and five understandings5 5 to the Implementation Act to designate
intepretations and clarify obligations as set out in the Treaty
text.
The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
understandings, which apply to the obligations of the United
States under this Convention:
(1) That the term "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group as such" appearing
in Article II means the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such by the acts specified in Article II.
(2) That the term "mental harm" in Article II(b) means permanent impairment of mental faculties through drugs, torture or
similar techniques.
(3) That the pledge to grant extradition in accordance with a
state's laws and treaties in force found in Article VII extends
only to acts which are criminal under the laws of both the
requesting and the requested state and nothing in Article VI
affects the right of any state to bring to trial before its own
tribunals any of its nationals for acts committed outside a state.
(4) The acts in the course of armed conflicts committed without
the specific intent required by Article II are not sufficient to
constitute genocide as defined by this Convention.
(5) That with regard to the reference to an international penal
tribunal in Article VI of the Convention, the United States
declares that it reserves the right to effect its participation in

53. Id
54. Id
55. "According to the State Department memorandum, a reservationexcludes or varies
the legal effect of one or more provisions of a treaty in their application to the reserving
state; an understanding merely explains or clarifies the meaning of one or more provisions
of a treaty but does not exclude or vary their legal effect." LEBLANC, supra note 17, at
10.
56. RICHARD G. LUGAR, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME
OF GENOCIDE, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter REPORT].
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any such tribunal only by a treaty entered into specifically for
that purpose with the advice and consent of the Senate.'
The two reservations included: (1) World Court Reservation
and (2) a Constitutional Reservation.58 The World Court Reservation "gives the United States the option of accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in a given dispute
under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. ' ,59 The Constitutional Reservation makes it clear that "if any article is construed
to require the United States to act in a way barred by the U.S.
Constitution, the Committee's reservation will excuse the United
States from the obligation. " 60
Despite these five understandings and two reservations, the
Committee made no recommendation for amending the scope of
"genocide" under the Convention. 1 This is remarkable considering the fact that the Convention has not been revised or updated
since its inception in 1948. The Committee rationalized its decision not to make amendments by saying: "Ninety-six other states
have ratified the Convention as it was drafted. Thus, Senate
approval conditioned on the adoption of an amendment would be
tantamount to Senate rejection of the Convention."6
2. Existing statement of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1990
President George Bush signed the INA of 1990 on November
29, 1990, labeling it "the most comprehensive reform of our
The 1990 Act substantially
immigration laws in 66 years."'
altered the preference system by: (1) establishing categories of

57. Id at 27.
58. Id at 18-19.
59. Id. at 18. Some dissenting Senators asserted that this reservation suggests that the
United States is concerned about the "validity of charges which unfriendly nations might
attempt to assert in the World Court." Id at 29.
60. Id at 20. The dissenting Senators believe that this reservation "will seriously
compromise the political and moral prestige the United States can otherwise attain in the
world community by unqualified ratification." Id at 31. This reservation basically implies
that the Convention is ratified insofar as we find no violation of the Constitution in the
future. Id.
61. REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.
62. Id.

63. Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing S. 358, 26 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1946 (Dec. 3,1990).
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employment based on immigration and redefining "immediate
relatives"; (2) changing the definitions of many nonimmigrant
categories; (3) establishing temporary protected status programs;
(4) redefining and broadening laws concerning criminal aliens; (5)
substantially raising the level of INS fines; and (6) altering court
procedures." The most significant change for purposes of this
Comment was the addition of "genocide" as an excludable and
deportable offense.
The addition of genocide as an excludable and deportable
offense to the current immigration policy illustrates the U.S. desire
to deal effectively with the problem of genocide. Not coincidentally, the addition of genocide to immigration law occurred just two
years after the signing of the Implementation Act. Clearly, this
1990 amendment is in accordance with Article V of the Convention as "necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the
present Convention."'6
Section 212(a) of the Act excludes persons who committed
genocide under the general category of exclusion on "security and
related grounds."' Section 212(a) excludes "[a]ny alien who has
engaged in conduct that is defined as genocide for purposes of the
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide., 67 This same category excludes Nazi participants.'
Unfortunately, the section 212(a) language represents the extent
of the legislative guidance on interpreting who is a participant of
genocide. No mention of genocide exists in the legislative history
of the 1990 amendment. Thus, one can only look to the Convention itself, and possibly examine Nazi deportation proceedings, for
guidance.

64. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 8 (1994).
65. Convention, supra note 3, at 277.
66. INA of 1990, supra note 9.
67. Id.
68. Idt The title of category (E) of the INA of 1990 is "Participants in Nazi Persecutions or Genocide." I& The language for the exclusion of Nazi participants is identical
to that in the Holtzman Amendment of 1978.
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IV. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON

GENOCIDE
A. No Clear Universal Definition of Genocide
The main problem with the language of the INA of 1990 is its
failure to clearly define "genocide." The only guidance it gives is
its reference to the Convention, which is over forty years old. The
Convention's definition is not only vague, more importantly, it is
inapplicable to today's world. Consider the context in which the
global community implemented the original Convention. World
War II just ended and the world had witnessed the systematic
genocide of millions of Jews and individuals of other ethnicities.
Few dispute that the Nazis committed genocide, regardless of its
disputable definition. In the past few years, the world has
witnessed many atrocities which could be viewed as genocide.
Nevertheless, the global community has done little to combat these
atrocities or even label them as genocide under the Convention.
The most recent example is the massacre of some 500,000
Rwandans.69 Despite the horrific number of deaths, little has
been done to prosecute this massacre as a crime of genocide under
the Convention.70 This delay is due in part to the lack of clarity
in the Convention itself Unlike Nazi Germany, Rwanda appears
to be in a state of civil war between competing tribes, the Hutus
and the Tutsis. Many of the murders in Rwanda were committed
in an atmosphere of chaos. Thus, unlike World War II, in Rwanda
there was no apparent systematic plan or explicit intent to
exterminate. This situation, while not analogous to the Nazi
persecutions, still could be characterized as genocide. A U.N.
official commented on the difficulty of investigating this crime:

69. UN Panel Charges Genocide in Rwanda, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 1994, at 4.
70. On February 22, 1995, the United Nations and the government of the United
Republic of Tanzania decided that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will have its seat
at Arusha. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3502d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/977 (1995). On
April 24, 1995, the Security Council established a list of potential candidates for this
International Tribunal. U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3524th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/989
(1995). These two steps will hopefully lead to the prosecution of individuals responsible
for the Rwandan atrocities.
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"We need a minimum of 147 independent investigators
in Rwanda
1
.... We need $10 million for six months of work.0
Another example is the current conflict in Bosnia. On Ma
25, 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 827.
This Resolution established an international tribunal at the Hague
to investigate and prosecute persons responsible for violations of
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.73 Additionally, the
Resolution called for the cooperation of all member states to
implement its provisions.74 Despite the strong rhetoric of Resolution 827,75 little has been done to curtail the atrocities in that
country.
As in Rwanda, one of the main impediments to stopping the
Bosnian murders is a lack of uniform global recognition that acts
of genocide are occurring in the former Yugoslavia. Nazi
Germany is the only prior example of mass genocide the international community uniformly recognizes in this century. Major
distinctions between the circumstances of Nazi Germany and
Bosnia contribute to this pervasive lack of will within the international community. For example, the victors in Bosnia are
primarily responsible for the policy of "ethnic cleansing." Yet any
apparent U.N. peace agreement would probably require some form
of immunity provision for the Serb leaders. The Convention loses
its legitimate force and deterrent effect when the global community seeks peace even at the cost of failing to bring these war criminals to justice. Consequently, "the U.N. and the E.C. negotiators

71. Christopher McDougall, Trials Urgedfor Rwanda War Crimes, PHILA.

INQUIRER,

Sept. 17, 1994, at D15.
72. Security Council Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecutionof Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th

mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
73. Id.

74. Id. Point four of the Resolution states that "all states shall cooperate fully with
the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution ...all
states shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the
provisions of the present resolution." Id.
75. The World This Week- Politics and Current Affairs, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 1994, at
6. The Hague Tribunal did not issue its first indictment until November 1994. The
indictment was against Dragan Nikolic, a former Bosnian Serb concentration camp
commander. Id. The Tribunal issued its first mass indictments on February 13, 1995,
"charging 21 Serbs with murdering, raping and torturing Muslim and Croat inmates at the
notorious Omarska prison camp." Jon Henley, Serb Jailers Charged with Murder, Rape
and Torture, GUARDIAN, Feb. 14, 1995, at 9, available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS.

Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.

[Vol. 17:925

have lent them some legitimacy, despite the fact
that war crimes
76
have been perpetrated under their leadership.
Another distinguishing factor is that the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia does not involve the systematic plan of extermination
present in World War II. The press does not broadcast images of
gas chambers, mass grave sites, and egregious concentration camps
each night. One may also argue that modern society has become
desensitized to these deplorable acts of terror. Thus, deprived of
the globally recognized images associated with genocide, no
uniform public consensus acknowledges the existence of genocide
in Bosnia. This apathy can only be eliminated by a contemporary
definition of genocide that can be applied in today's changed
environment. Earnest revision of the Convention or a new
Genocide Convention is needed to educate the world that
genocide can occur in any part of the world and it does not have
to resemble the murderous scheme of Nazi Germany.
B.

ConstitutionalConcerns Over Current Immigration
Procedure
Lack of a clear definition of genocide raises certain constitutional concerns for U.S. immigration courts. Due process, equal
protection, and Eighth Amendment claims are prevalent whenever
courts have little or no precedent to follow. Because no U.S. court
has yet excluded a person on the basis of the genocide provision
of the INA of 1990, courts may manipulate and interpret the
provision in any manner. This lack of precedent might lead to
great injustice for the individual defendants.
The U.S. Constitution states that no person within its
jurisdiction shall be denied equal protection under the laws.'
Lack of judicial precedent and legislative guidance could lead to
equal protection concerns. Too much court discretion might lead
to inequitable application of the laws. Especially in this age of
immigrant hostility, a court may be unsympathetic to a recent
immigrant defendant. Also, the U.S. legal system as a whole must
develop a consistent application of the genocide provision. The
law should not be interpreted differently from courtroom to
courtroom.

76. Jeri Laber & Ivana Nizich, The War Crimes Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia:
Problems and Prospects, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 7 (1994).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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The Constitution also guarantees due process stating that no
person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."78 Due process is essential to protecting the
opportunity to establish a livelihood within the United States. This
requires that the United States follow certain procedures before
deporting an individual. One of the most obvious procedures is
the right to be heard in a court of law. How formal this hearing
ought to be, however, remains unclear. Many questions remain
unanswered. How much fact-finding is the court required to do?
Can the court just accept the verdict of the United Nations, or
some other country for that matter? Must a U.S. court honor any
U.N. immunity clauses concerning particular war criminals? U.S.
courts must be given more guidance on the interpretation and
application of the genocide provision to ensure that each individual
gets due process of law.
Finally, the Eighth Amendment prohibits inflicting "cruel and
unusual punishment" upon any defendant.79 It is not immediately
apparent how a deportation hearing implicates this Amendment.
When a state deports an immigrant, a possibility exists that some
kind of punishment awaits him in his state of origin. Many states
convict defendants even in absentia, giving those individuals no
opportunity to be heard.'
One case in particular, United States v. Linnas,81 implicated
the cruel and unusual punishment clause. A New York federal
district court revoked Linnas' citizenship upon discovery that he
headed a Nazi concentration camp at Tartu, Estonia.' Shortly
thereafter, an administrative law judge of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service set Linnas' deportation date, which the
Second Circuit affirmed.'
Although Linnas' case was not criminal, it had criminal
implications because a death sentence awaited him in the former

78. Id
79. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
80. The former Soviet Union tried people in absentia. See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner,
Due Processfor All?, Due Process, the Eighth Amendment and Nazi War Criminals,80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1989).
81. 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. Id at 428.
83. Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986), reh'g
denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
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Soviet Union.4 The constitutional guarantees in the Soviet
criminal process differed greatly from those in the United
States. 85 Presumably Linnas would not have received the same
due process protection as he would have in the United States.
Thus, it is imperative that U.S. deportation proceedings take
special measures to safeguard a defendant's constitutional rights
here in the United States.
As was the case with Linnas' deportation under the Nazi
provision, deportations under the genocide provision of the INA
of 1990 implicate Eighth Amendment concerns. Many governments still try people in absentia, allowing criminal sentences to
stand until the United States deports them. Deporting war
criminals under the genocide provision is the equivalent of an
extradition.' Yet war criminals may be deported to countries
with whom the United States does not have an extradition treaty
because of the INA.' Deportation hearings of war criminals,
under the Nazi and genocide provisions, must provide a more thorough fact-finding mission in order to safeguard their rights under
U.S. laws. "Genocide," therefore, must be more clearly defined in
U.S. immigration policy.

84. Beiner, supra note 80, at 293. A Soviet court sentenced Linnas to death in
absentia. Id. Karl Linnas died on July 2, 1987, of "acute cardiovascular, renal and hepatic
insufficiency" while awaiting execution. William J. Eaton, Deported War Criminal Dies
in Soviet Hospital, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1987, at 1.
85. The arrested person in the most serious cases in the Soviet system may not receive
any visitors, letters, or telephone calls during his confinement. Thus, arranging appropriate
legal representation is very difficult. Beiner, supra note 80, at 295 n.17. Also, the Soviet
criminal system is based on Romanist tradition, which employs a "preliminary investigator"
who conducts an investigation in secrecy. Id. at n.20.
86. The Supreme Court has defined extradition as "the surrender of one nation to
another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own territory...
which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v.
Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
87. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1994). These statutes allow for the extradition of any
person "[wjhenever there is a treaty or convention for extraditions between the United
States and any foreign government." 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1994). Thus, the United States may
extradite persons to states that are party to the Genocide Convention even though no
separate extradition treaty exists between that state and the United States.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

Analogizing Genocide Cases with Nazi DeportationHearings
No court has defined the genocide provision of the INA of
1990. Thus, nothing in the way of U.S. or international tribunal
case precedent exists. When courts are required to adjudicate such
a case in the future, they should compare the analysis to one of
the many Nazi deportation hearings. This method of analysis is
legitimate for two reasons. First, the Nazi persecutions of World
War II were acts of genocide. Thus, when an immigration court
concludes that an individual was involved in the Nazi persecutions,
one could also label him as a participant to genocide. Second,
both provisions fall under the same category of "Exclusion on
security and related grounds."88 Thus, one can assume that the
judicial inquiry for each should be similar. TWo cases in particular,
Fedorenko v. United States 9 and Petkiewytsch v. INS,9' are
helpful in defining the scope of who is punishable as a participant
of genocide.
1. Fedorenko v. United States
Fedor Fedorenko was a member of the Russian Army in 1941,
but the Germans captured him shortly thereafter. 9 Initially, the
Germans sent him to a camp in Travnicki, Poland, to train as a
concentration camp guard; later they assigned him as a guard for
the Nazi concentration camp in Treblinka, Poland.' The Germans provided him a rifle and uniform, and he served as a guard
during 1942 and 1943.' 3 In August 1943, the Germans transferred
Fedorenko to a labor camp at Danzig and then to a prisoner-ofwar camp at Poelitz, where he continued to serve as an armed
guard. 4 Shortly before the British forces entered the city in
1945, he discarded his uniform to pass as a civilian. 9,

88. INA of 1990, supra note 9.
89. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).

90. 945 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1991).
91. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 494.
92. Id. The district court described the Treblinka concentration camp as a "human
abattoir" at which several hundred thousand Jewish civilians were murdered. Id.
93. Ld.
94. Id.

95. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 494.
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Fedorenko applied for admission to the United States in
1949.' He lied on his visa application by stating that he was a
farmer in Poland when the Germans abducted him and forced him
to work in a factory until the end of the war.9 His false statements were not discovered, and he was admitted under the
DPA. 9 In 1969, he applied for naturalization. He again lied
about his wartime activities during sworn testimony, and the
United States granted him citizenship.'
The government filed a district court action to revoke
Fedorenko's citizenship because he procured his naturalization
illegally by misrepresenting material facts.'" At trial, Fedorenko
admitted his service as an armed guard, but claimed that he was
forced to serve and denied any personal involvement in the
atrocities at the camp in Treblinka.' ' He also conceded that he
made false statements to procure the visa."° The district court
entered judgment in favor of Fedorenko, finding that: (1) he was
forced to serve as a guard; (2) the false statements were not
material; (3) the government had not met its burden in proving
that he committed war crimes or atrocities at Treblinka; and (4)
even assuming misrepresentation of material facts, equitable and
mitigating circumstances permitted him to retain his citizenship.1 3 The Justice Department appealed to the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, which reversed the district court."
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals." Justice Marshall wrote for the majority, stating that
"an individual's service as a concentration camp armed
guard-whether voluntary or involuntary-made him ineligible for

96. Id. at 496.
97. Id
98. 1d
99. Id. at 497.
100. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 498.
101. Id at 500.
102. Id
103. Id.at 501, 503.
104. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979). The court of appeals
held that the district court erred as a matter of law because the government merely had
to "prove by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the true facts would have led
the government to make an inquiry that might have uncovered other facts warranting
denial of citizenship." Id at 951. The government presented expert testimony stating that
any visa applicant who had served as a concentration camp guard was ineligible as a
matter of law for a visa. Id.at 952.
105. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 490.
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a visa ....Under traditional principles of statutory construction,
the deliberate omission of the word 'voluntary' from § 2(a)
compels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted
in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas. ' 6 The Supreme Court also held that "district courts lack equitable discretion to refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization
against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured
illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts."'"
The Supreme Court's analysis in Fedorenko can be applied to
deportation cases based on the genocide provision. Most importantly, the Court held that even involuntary service as a Nazi guard
is within the congressional intent to deport Nazi participants.
Thus, in a genocide case, a participant may not use involuntary
service as a defense. This is significant in the context of Bosnia.
If a person's actions of that war are considered genocide, he can
be excluded from the United States despite the fact that he may
have been required to follow the orders of his military superiors.
Comparatively, members of the forces fighting in the former
Yugoslavia may not have been "forced" or coerced to the same
extent as Fedorenko was by the Nazis.
The other important holding of the Fedorenko Court was its
declaration that the district court lacked equitable discretion to
refrain from entering a judgment against deportation. In other
words, once a court determines that an individual either participated in Nazi persecutions or acts of genocide, the court has no
choice but to deport the individual. A court cannot examine such
mitigating factors as duration of citizenship in the United States
and familial ties in the country. This demonstrates the strong U.S.
policy against admitting individuals who have committed such
atrocities.
2. Petkiewytsch v. INS
Leonid Petkiewytsch was captured and assigned to a laboreducation camp in Kiel, Germany, to serve as a civilian guard.1"
106. Id.at 512.
107. Id.at 517. After his deportation, Fedorenko "was sentenced to death by a court
in the Crimea in the Soviet Ukraine in June, 1986, on charges of treason and taking part
in mass executions at the Treblinka death camp." William J. Eaton, Soviets Execute ExNazi Guard Deported by U.S., L.A. TIMEs, July 28, 1987, at 1. The official news agency
Tass reported that he was executed on July 27, 1987. Id.
108. Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d at 872.
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The petitioner was issued a Gestapo SS uniform, given a rifle, and
instructed on how to escort prisoners to and from work sites and
how to clean and load his rifle."° His primary responsibility was
to prevent prisoners from escaping, and he was under orders to
shoot anyone attempting to escape.'
During his eight-month
service as a guard, the petitioner never used his rifle nor inflicted
any physical abuse on the prisoners."'
Petitioner applied for entrance into the United States in
March 1948, under the DPA."2 He was denied entrance because
of his stated service as a civilian guard at the labor-education
camp." 3 The petitioner reapplied and was granted an admission
visa in 1955 under the INA of 1952, which then contained no
provision denying
admission to those who participated in the Nazi
4
persecutions."
In July 1985, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") issued an Order to Show Cause stating that Petkiewytsch
was deportable under the Holtzman Amendment of 1978, for
"assisting or otherwise participating in Nazi persecution."" 5 The
court ruled against deportation because the petitioner had not
personally engaged in any persecutional acts and that his
"wrongful conduct, at most, was his acceptance under duress of his
6
duties as a civilian labor-education camp guard.""1
The INS appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration
Appeals. The Board focused on the issue of whether "the
'objective effect' of the petitioner's conduct controlled and that the
'objective effect' of his service as civilian guard was to assist the
Nazis in their persecution of those within Kiel-Hasse by preventing
their escape.""' 7 Consequently, the Board answered this issue in
the affirmative, thereby reversing the immigration judge's decision.
Thus, whether the petitioner himself engaged in any sort of
physical abuse or persecution was irrelevant. The court based its
decision merely on Petkiewytsch's duties as a guard at a facility

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id
Id
Id at 873.
Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d at 873.

113. Id
114. Id

115. Id at 874.
116. Id
117. Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d at 874.
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"where persons were persecuted based upon race, religion,
national origin, or political opinion."" 8
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Board's
decision by focusing on the personal involvement of the petitioner. 9 This court concentrated on "whether particular conduct
can be considered assisting in the persecution of civilians ' ' 1
Subsequent to the Fedorenko decision, lower courts had great
difficulty determining what type of conduct constituted "assisting
the persecution of civilians."' '1 The court of appeals found that
the petitioner did not assist in the Nazi effort to the extent of the
petitioner in Fedorenko.t2 2
The Sixth Circuit in Petkiewytsch concentrated on the extent
of personal involvement when interpreting the "Nazi participation"
under U.S. immigration law. Likewise, one may be deemed a
"participant of genocide" based on the extent of their personal
involvement in the atrocities. Applying this to the context of
Bosnia, one can see how certain members of the military may or
may not be "participants to genocide," depending on their duties.
This inquiry still leaves significant discretion to the lower courts in
deciding where the lines should be drawn.
B. Using the Existing Convention's Language
Thus far, it appears that Congress intends to use the language
of the Convention to give meaning to the term "genocide" as it
appears in the INA of 1990. This, however, should not preclude
immigration courts from looking to the Nazi deportation proceedings to aid in the statutory interpretation of the INA of 1990.
The most valuable legislative guidance on interpreting the
Convention appears in the 1987 Genocide Implementation Act and
the attached Committee provisions." According to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations Report, the Convention had two
118. Id. at 875.
119. Id. at 871.
120. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. at 512.
121. Petkiewytsch v. INS, 945 F.2d at 877. See generally Schellong v. INS, 805 F.2d 655
(7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir. 1986); Laipenieks v. INS,
750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985); Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985).
122. Petkiewytsch v,INS, 945 F.2d at 877. In Fedorenko, the petitioner deliberately
concealed his involvement as a guard in his application for a visa and for citizenship. Id
Fedorenko also admitted to shooting in the general direction of escaping prisoners during
his guard service. Id
123. REPORT, supra note 56, at 17.
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purposes: "To codify international law respecting the crime of
genocide ... [and] to require the parties to the Convention to
deter acts of genocide and punish, pursuant to their municipal
laws, individuals who commit genocide."' 24
If one views the inclusion of genocide to the U.S. immigration
law as a municipal law, which seeks to deter acts of genocide, then
one must enforce that provision with that purpose in mind. This
means that an immigration judge must determine whether
deporting a particular defendant, suspected of participating in
genocide, would further the goal of deterrence. The judge can
accomplish this by looking at both the individual's mens rea, or
state of mind, and actus reus, or acts.
Thus, the particular defendant's state of mind at the time of
the alleged events is relevant. With the current analysis, the
United States will deport only those individuals who possessed the
specific intent to commit genocide. Thus, only those with specific
intent will be deterred by U.S. deportation proceedings. One of
the Committee understandings emphasized that "intent to destroy
... in Article II means the specific intent to destroy."1"
Using this rationale, one can see how "forced military service"
would not constitute a defense to deportation on the grounds of
genocide. The mere fact that someone may have coerced another
into committing genocide atrocities does not eliminate the mens
rea of that person.
As in the Nazi immigration hearings, courts must continue to
draw lines in determining what constitutes the actus reus, "participating or assistance in genocide." In order to further the goal of
deterrence, immigration judges must target individuals who played
a significant personal role in the genocide. For example, deterrence is not furthered when the United States deports an individual who was merely an army cook. The United States lacks both
the financial and personnel resources to investigate and bring suit
against every possible person who may have had some attenuated
nexus with a group that committed genocide.

124. Id. at 1.
125. Id at 27.
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C. Change at the InternationalLevel
1. Reformation of the Genocide Convention
The most effective yet most difficult way to clarify the term
"genocide" is to amend the Convention itself. Amending the
Convention is vital in that many states are implementing similar
domestic legislative measures and they refer back to the Convention's definition of genocide for guidance.'26 Thus, in order to
limit varying interpretations of the Convention among the
members of the global community, the Convention itself must be
revised according to today's changed political, social, and economic
environment.
The new convention, first and foremost, should define
genocide more broadly so that it protects a greater variety of
people. Currently, the Convention of 1949 protects groups defined
on a "national, ethnic, racial, or religious" basis. 12
Today,
groups are defined by a wider range of characteristics and the
Convention should also protect these groups. For instance, a new
convention should protect groups based on sexual orientation,
political affiliation, economic status, and gender. This would
improve the current Convention, which takes a myopic view in its
protection of groups by defining them merely by nationality,
ethnicity, race, or religion.
Article II of the Convention only covers acts committed with
128
specific intent against those specifically designated groups.
One scholar on humanitarian violations suggests that a new
convention should not just be limited to situations of specific
intent.129 He suggests that it is illogical "to have a legal scheme

126. Former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney established a commission in
1985 to examine the handling of war criminals in the country. The Deschenes Commission
identified some eight hundred persons in Canada who may have committed war crimes,
most of them Nazi war criminals. Among the options the Commission suggested were the
extradition or denaturalization of war criminals or criminal prosecution. The government
chose to pursue criminal prosecution, but "[w]hile not rejecting the other two options--extradition and denaturalization/deportation-the government chose to reserve
those processes for cases in which criminal prosecution was not viable." Symposium,
Holocaust and Human Rights Law: The Sixth International Conference, 12 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 199, 206 (1992).
127. Convention, supra note 3, art. II, at 280.
128. Id
129. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 477.
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whereby the intentional killing of a single person can be genocide
and the killing of millions of persons without intent to destroy the
protected group in whole or in part is not an intentional
crime."'"3
This argument makes sense if the purpose of the
Convention is effective deterrence and conviction. Many other
crimes are committed with a lower intent level such as recklessness
or gross negligence. It is difficult for courts to convict people of
genocide because of the high intent level now required. A lower
mens rea, or intent, is needed to effectively prosecute participants
in genocide.
Finally, the new convention should provide procedural
guidelines for states to follow when they try to implement their
own domestic laws prosecuting genocide participants. A revised
definition of genocide is not enough to effectively deal with this
problem without the appropriate procedural steps.
2.

Creation of a Permanent International Tribunal

a. Benefits of a PermanentInternationalTribunal
In addition to a clear definition and interpretation of the term
"genocide," effective prosecution of genocide perpetrators requires
creation of a permanent international tribunal. Such a tribunal will
make it easier for countries, such as the United States, to exclude
people on a more consistent basis because of their participation in
acts of genocide. Resolution 827 requests that "all states shall take
any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the
provisions" of the Hague Tribunal.'
States cannot easily implement effective and consistent domestic laws punishing genocide
when such international tribunals are formed only after certain
crises and for a short period of time.
A permanent tribunal will aid in the consistent application of
the genocide provision of the INA of 1990 for a number of
reasons. First, a permanent body will help establish consistent case
law on the subject. As it stands now, no international precedent
exists on how genocide should be interpreted. Instead, it is left to
the discretion of the individual countries. International case law
would be given strong precedential value in the United States to
limit any abuse of discretion by the immigration courts. Second,
130. 1I
131. U.N. Doc. S/RES/827, supra note 72, at 2.
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the tribunal can establish procedural guidelines for domestic courts
to follow when adjudicating their own trials. This would correct
the problems related to lack of consistent constitutional safeguards
for war criminals.
A permanent international tribunal also will provide more of
a deterrent effect on the commission of genocidal acts. Establishing such a tribunal would send a united message that the international community will not tolerate perpetrators of genocide. Such
a body also would be more effective in monitoring the actions of
countries and intervening before mass genocide occurs.
b. OrganizationalStructure of a PermanentInternational
Tribunal
To add legitimacy to any tribunal, members of the permanent
international tribunal should be representative of a wide range of
countries. A tribunal consisting only of the economic superpowers
would fail to gain respect from the rest of the world because it
would be viewed as elitist. The most effective way to ensure
diverse and qualified membership is to form a special committee
within the U.N. that will nominate and interview potential justices.
The committee will conduct the initial screening process of
candidates, and it should be free to investigate each candidate's
education, experience, and track record. Finally, the U.N. General
Assembly should confirm the tribunal justices to ensure that every
member-state will play some role in the selection.
The justices should serve lengthy terms and be independent
of any political pressures. Five to ten-year terms, for example, will
ensure consistent enforcement and punishment of war criminals.
Political independence will enable the justices to investigate and
fairly try alleged perpetrators of genocide.
A permanent international tribunal should have two purposes:
prevention and prosecution. One branch of the tribunal will act
as watchdog. It will serve to identify potential situations of
genocide. Once a country is identified, the investigating tribunal
can present its findings to the U.N. and ask that it step in to quell
the crisis before it escalates. One of the primary weaknesses of
the U.N. today is that it endeavors to resolve a crisis only after it
has escalated beyond control.
The other branch of the tribunal will conduct any punishment
of participants of genocide. Here, the domestic immigration laws
of participant nations play an important role. Today, a significant
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obstacle facing the Hague Tribunal is that alleged war criminals
are hiding out in countries all over the world. The new tribunal
should have the power to indict alleged perpetrators in absentia,
and pressure domestic deportation policies to turn over these
individuals to the tribunal so that they may stand trial. Consequently, the international community must give clear guidance to
individual countries as to who is deportable as an alleged participant in genocide.
VI. CONCLUSION
The world has not learned from its past mistakes. After the
deaths of millions of innocent persons at the hands of the Nazis
during World War II, one would expect the states of the world to
have implemented a consistent policy of dealing with genocide.
This is not the case. Rwanda and Bosnia are just two contemporary acts of genocide committed by individuals who go unpunished.
The only way to punish these acts of inhumane violence is
through effective and consistent enforcement of the laws criminalizing genocide. The United States has taken a bold step in adding
"genocide" as a deportable offense under its current immigration
policy. To date, however, this step has not been tested. A
uniform method for interpreting genocide is essential for adequate
enforcement of the Convention's provisions. More importantly,
procedural changes must occur at the international level, so that
all countries may refer to a contemporary, coherent, and cohesive
document when implementing their own domestic laws on
genocide.
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